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Ten Years of Pena: Revisiting the Utah Mixed Question
Standard of Appellate Review
Andrew Franklin Peterson*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the Utah Supreme Court issued State v. Pena.1 That
landmark opinion became the basic “analytic framework for determining
the extent to which an appellate court should grant discretion to a trial
court’s application of law to the facts of a case,”2 otherwise known as
mixed questions of fact and law. The hallmark of Pena may be its use of
two distinct metaphors—the “pasture of discretion” and the “spectrum of
discretion.”3 As a result of the discretion analysis, however, the Pena
framework not only applies to mixed questions of fact and law but also
defines the power of appellate courts to review all trial court decisions.4
Thus, Pena’s framework is ubiquitous in Utah law and is cited perhaps
more often than any other Utah case.5 At the same time, however, I am
unaware of any other jurisdiction that uses a similar framework for
addressing the question of “how closely [appellate courts] should
scrutinize”6 trial courts’ decisions. Given Pena’s singularity in the
universe of appellate law and its universal application in Utah, one may
justifiably ask whether ten years of application have proved its wisdom
and practical viability.
This Note will first explain Pena’s analytical framework within the

This comment is an extension of a lecture, “Utah Standards of Review,” given in part by the author
at the Utah State Bar Appellate Section CLE Seminar, February 6, 2004, Utah State Bar Law and
Justice Center, Salt Lake City, Utah.
*
Andrew Franklin Peterson is an active member of the Utah State Bar and practices appellate and
business law at Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin in Provo, Utah. He formerly served as a law clerk
to the Honorable Judge Norman H. Jackson of the Utah Court of Appeals.
1. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
2. James E. Berchtold, Development, Recent Developments in Utah Case Law: A New
Analytic Framework for Determining Standards of Appellate Review, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 278, 278.
3. Justice Michael J. Wilkins of the Utah Supreme Court uses the term “sliding scale of
scrutiny” to describe the Pena framework. Justice Michael J. Wilkins et. al, A “Primer” in Utah
State Appellate Practice, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 111, 129.
4. See generally Pena, 869 P.2d at 932.
5. As of June 23, 2004, a Lexis search indicated that Pena had been cited in more than three
hundred subsequent cases.
6. Pena, 869 P.2d at 937.
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context of appellate challenges to trial court decisions. It will then
challenge both the framework itself and the use of its metaphors. This
challenge stems principally from theoretical problems within the
framework, and secondarily from the difficulty, if not the impossibility,
of practical application in subsequent case law. This Note will then
discuss a workable alternative framework for analyzing mixed questions.
Finally, it will discuss practical considerations for the appellate advocate
who presents a mixed question to an appellate court in Utah.
II. BACKGROUND: PENA’S THEORY
Pena stands as the most definitive statement on Utah theory of
appellate standards of review. The central question in appellate standards
of review, according to Pena, is what level of scrutiny to apply to trial
court decisions:
[I]t is our role as an appellate court to define what the law is, and we
never defer to any degree to a trial court on that count. That statement
does not, however, tell us much about how closely we should scrutinize
the application of a statement of legal principle to a specific set of facts.
Yet this is a critical question, for at bottom, what a legal principle
means in reality can often be determined only by considering how its
general terms are given sharp definition through their application to a
series of specific fact situations. Determining what the law is actually
involves an inductive process as much as a deductive one. The
governing legal standard is as often derived by abstraction from
specific applications as it is defined in the abstract and then applied to
specific situations.7

Pena goes on to describe a “spectrum of discretion” that appellate courts
grant to trial courts, “running from ‘de novo’ [review] on the one hand to
‘broad discretion’ on the other.”8 The court defines discretion as the
ability of “trial court[s] to reach one of several possible conclusions
about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking
reversal.”9

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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A. A Spectrum of Discretion
In general, appellate courts review legal conclusions “de novo”10 and
factual questions with broad deference to the trial court.11 Those two
positions occupy the polar ends of the discretion spectrum under the
Pena framework.12 Application of the respective standards of review for
fact and law issues is relatively simple because appellate courts are the
final arbiters of legal issues,13 and the rules of civil and appellate
procedure provide straightforward procedural mechanisms for review of
findings of fact.14 Thus, at the two ends of the discretion spectrum,
standard of review analysis poses little problem.
In the middle of that spectrum, where mixed questions of fact and
law are found, lies the more difficult problem—that is, “does the legal
standard . . . grant any discretion to the trial judge in applying that
standard to a set of facts?”15 In other words, a “mixed question involves .
. . ‘the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the
reach of a given rule of law.’”16 These inquiries are often fact intensive
to varying degrees and, thus, may fall anywhere along the discretion
spectrum.17 Pena identifies, and subsequent cases have expanded, a
litany of issues that should be analyzed as mixed questions where the
appellate court allows the trial court a greater or lesser amount of
discretion in applying the law to the facts.18
B. The Pasture Metaphor
Aside from the spectrum metaphor, Pena uses the metaphor of a
pasture to describe the bounds of the trial court’s discretion.19

10. See Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35, 39 (Utah 2003).
11. See State v. Daniels, 40 P.3d 611, 617 (Utah 2002).
12. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36; Judge Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate
Review: Revised, 12 UTAH BAR J. 8, 12 (1999).
13. See Mariemont Corp. v. White City Water Improvement Dist., 958 P.2d 222, 223 (Utah
1998); MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 630-31 (Utah 1995).
14. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) (setting forth marshaling requirement to challenge fact
finding); UTAH R. CIV. P. 52(a) (setting forth appellate court deference and clearly erroneous
standard for reviewing fact finding). See also Ryan D. Tenney, The Utah Marshalling Requirement:
An Overview, 17 UTAH BAR J. 22 (2004).
15. Pena, 869 P.2d at 937.
16. State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 659 n.3 (Utah 2002) (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 936).
17. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38.
18. See id. at 938; Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998); Cassidy v. Salt Lake
County Fire Civil Serv. Council, 976 P.2d 607, 613 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
19. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38 (borrowing the pasture metaphor from an article by
Professor Maurice Rosenberg); See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court,
Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971).
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To the extent that a trial judge’s pasture is small because he or she is
fenced in closely by the appellate courts and given little room to roam in
applying a stated legal principle to facts, the operative standard of review
approximates what can be described as “de novo.” That is, the appellate
court closely and regularly redetermines the legal effect of specific facts.
But to the extent that the pasture is large, the trial judge has considerable
freedom in applying a legal principle to the facts, freedom to make
decisions which appellate judges might not make themselves ab initio but
will not reverse—in effect, creating the freedom to be wrong without
incurring reversal. Only when the trial judge crosses an existing fence or
when the appellate court feels comfortable in more closely defining the
law by fencing off a part of the pasture previously available does the trial
judge’s decision exceed the broad discretion granted.
As can be imagined, the real amount of pasture permitted a trial
judge will vary depending on the legal issue, although the terminology
we use to describe the operative standard of review does not begin to
reflect the many shades of this variance. The best we can do is to
recognize that such a spectrum of discretion exists and that the closeness
of appellate review of the application of law to fact actually runs the
entire length of the spectrum.20
C. Considerations Influencing the Degree of Discretion
Mixed questions generally involve subjects about which the law
cannot create a single, authoritative statement of principle. According to
Pena, there are three reasons that justify granting a greater degree of
discretion to the trial court in its application of the law to the facts: (1)
there are some areas of law where “the facts to which the legal rule is to
be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing
the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out;”21 (2) sometimes “the
legal principle . . . to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that
appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what
factors should be outcome determinative;”22 and (3) often “the trial judge
has observed ‘facts,’ such as a witness’s appearance and demeanor,
relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected
in the record available to appellate courts.”23
There are some considerations that warrant narrower allocation of
discretion by the appellate court to the trial court in its application of the
20.
21.
22.
23.

Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
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law to the facts. For example, the Utah Supreme Court determined
that while there were varying fact patterns that would be relevant to
determinations of voluntariness of consent, they were not so
unmanageable in their variety as to outweigh the interest in having
uniform legal rules regarding consent to search, given the substantial
Fourth Amendment interests lost as a result of such consents.24
Thus, the more important the rights at stake, the more likely the
appellate court will more closely fence in the trial court’s permitted
range of discretion. Another “factor weighing against broad discretion is
whether there are reasons of policy that require standard uniformity
among trial courts addressing the question.”25
The supreme court has also granted broader discretion to trial court
application of law to facts in cases involving merely procedural or
statutory rights as opposed to fundamental rights. For example, in Platts
v. Parents Helping Parents, the supreme court explained that the Utah
Medical Malpractice Act, by its own terms, gives the trial court some
discretion in applying the statutory definition of healthcare provider to
the particular facts of the case.26 In that case, the supreme court granted
broad discretion to the trial court in deciding whether the particular facts
of the case fit the statutory definition.27 It is noteworthy that even if the
defendant in Platts had not been classified under the statute as a
healthcare provider, the defendant would nevertheless have been entitled
to protections and remedies under general tort law and civil procedure.
Thus, the procedural and statutory rights at stake in Platts appear less
important than the rights at stake in State v. Thurman,28 where
determining the voluntariness of consent results either in the availability
or the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. 29
The range of discretion permitted to trial courts from issue to issue is
meant to be fluid, with appellate courts giving more discretion where
they think it is warranted and less where the contours of the law are more
clearly defined.30 Further, precisely how much discretion is warranted is
impossible to define even with a given issue like that in Pena. In that
case, the issue was whether the facts of the case gave rise to reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.31 The Pena court stated, “Precisely how
much discretion [the trial court has] we cannot say, but we would not
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993)).
Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998).
See 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997).
See id. at 663.
See generally State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993).
See id. at 1271 (weighing defendant’s waiver of Fourth Amendment rights).
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Utah 1994).
See id. at 934-35.
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anticipate a close, de novo review.”32 The court further provided, “The
best we can do is to recognize that such a spectrum of discretion exists
and that the closeness of appellate review of the application of law to fact
actually runs the entire length of this spectrum.”33 Thus, stating a single
standard of review for mixed questions does not begin to account for the
wide variance in amounts of discretion applicable from issue to issue. “If
we were to try,” the Pena court opined, “it is likely that the resulting case
law would be confusing and inconsistent.”34 Thus, rather than stating a
single standard of appellate review for mixed questions of law and fact,
the Utah Supreme Court has provided a flexible framework that allows
appellate courts to fence in or expand the trial court’s available
discretionary space after the fact.35
III. CRITICISM OF PENA
Although Pena’s theory of a sliding spectrum of discretion may
appear elegant and simple at first reading, in theory and practice it is
anything but. After ten years of application, appellate courts have been
unable to come to terms with a framework that contains no standards and
provides no guidance regarding the proper amount of discretion to afford
trial courts. Instead, the mixed question standard of review often ends up
being nothing more than a correctness review for legal determinations
and a clear error review for factual determinations. For example, in
Drake v. Industrial Commission, after stating it was following the Pena
analytical scheme, the supreme court said that it reviews the empirical
facts for clear error but that it would review whether those facts qualify
the plaintiff for workers’ compensation benefits under a particular rule
for correctness.36 A host of cases have approached mixed questions in a
virtually identical way, giving no practical effect to Pena’s spectrum of
discretion approach.37
32. Id. at 939.
33. Id. at 938.
34. Id. at 940.
35. See generally Jackson, supra note 12, at 24-26 (providing a thorough list and analysis of
examples of mixed questions).
36. See 939 P.2d 177, 181-82 (Utah 1997).
37. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 40 P.3d 611, 617 (Utah 2002) (“We have stated, as a general
rule, that we review . . . mixed questions as determinations of law for correctness.”); Woodhaven
Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 925-26 (Utah 1997) (setting forth Pena mixed question
standard, but resolving mixed question as a matter of law); State ex rel. M.C. v. State, 82 P.3d 1159,
1163 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (quoting In re G.B., 53 P.3d 963, 963 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citing In re
C.B., 989 P.2d 76 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)) (“‘[W]e review the juvenile court’s [factual] findings for
clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness, affording the court some discretion in applying
the law to the facts.’”); Walker v. Hansen, 74 P.3d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (citing Pena, 869
P.2d at 935-36) (“Whether the judgment should be reduced to reflect the payment of PIP or no-fault
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This approach raises an important question: If the supreme court is
so committed to a nuanced and flexible framework for apportioning
varying degrees of discretion to trial courts for mixed questions, why do
the applications of this standard of review often revert to the more rigid,
but clearly defined, standards of correctness and clear error? I submit that
a few basic fatal theoretical problems make Pena’s framework untenable.
These theoretical problems leave the courts no option but to apply the
remaining available standards while at the same time giving lip service to
Pena.
A. Theoretical Problems
First, the statement of the mixed question standard of review is itself
flawed. Pena states, “[T]here is really a third category—the application
of law to fact or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a given
set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law.”38 “[T]his
standard of review grants a measure of discretion to the trial court
because of the variability of the factual settings.”39 This explanation
demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the character and
principles of stare decisis, the rule of law, and the common law in
general. Courts never construe rules of law in the abstract without
applying them to facts. All legal principles apply to a variety of factual
settings. Under Pena’s formulation, then, it should be impossible to state
any legal principles with certainty “because of the variability of the
factual settings.”40
Under the common law, it is in the application of law to facts that the
rules of law gain expression and contour. It is the application of law that
gives birth to rules in the first place. Facts by themselves have no legal
significance, and law without application has no shape or form and is,
therefore, meaningless. Further, under the rule of law, it is not up to the
judge to decide if facts come within the reach of a given rule—rather, the
rule itself contains the seeds of its own application. A rule of law already
contains within its statement of principle the framework for determining
what facts come within its reach.
insurance is a mixed question of law and fact. We review the factual finding for clear error and the
legal conclusions for correctness.”); Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (indicating “whether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a
determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness”); State v. McDonald, 922
P.2d 776, 780-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the mixed question of whether right to counsel
was waived knowingly and intelligently is reviewed for correctness but that appellate courts afford
“reasonable measure of discretion” to the trial court because the issue is highly fact dependent).
38. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936.
39. Id. at 941.
40. Id.
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For example, the Utah Supreme Court “has defined seduction as ‘the
offense of inducing a woman to consent to unlawful sexual intercourse,
by enticements which overcome her scruples’ and as an act involving
‘some undue influence, artifice, deceit, fraud, or . . . some promise to
induce the plaintiff to surrender her chastity and virtue.’”41 This rule of
law contains within it sufficient bounds to determine whether any given
set of facts constitutes seduction. If any of the terms are unclear, other
precedent may be consulted to define them. Most, if not all, rules of law
are structured this way. Thus, it is the rules themselves, as expressed
over time through application in particular cases, that determine what
sets of facts come within their reach.
However, Pena’s framework, in greater or lesser degree, leaves to
judges to decide what facts tend toward legal significance. Where the
Pena framework refuses, by its own terms, to give a definite formulation
of the bounds of that discretion,42 the rule of law runs an even greater
danger of becoming subject to the particular personalities of individual
judges. This is true not only at the trial level but also at the appellate
level where judges are free to review so-called discretionary rulings with
the rigor of “something less than de novo [review].”43 It is axiomatic that
such a standardless jurisprudence subject to individual personality bears
no place in our version of the rule of law.
The supreme court expressed its reasons for refusing to define
beforehand how much discretion to give the trial court in particular
issues as follows: “If we were to try, it is likely that the resulting case
law would be confusing and inconsistent.”44 “The best we can do is to
recognize that such a spectrum of discretion exists and that the closeness
of appellate review of the application of law to fact actually runs the
entire length of this spectrum.”45 Thus, the supreme court made a
determination that rather than trying to pronounce a rule of law that
might cause inconsistent results it will, instead, avoid stating the
principles of law and undoubtedly reach inconsistent results. The court
will then try to sort out the inconsistencies after the fact. This is not
“[t]he best we can do.”46 Such a standardless approach itself causes “the
resulting case law . . . [to] be confusing and inconsistent.”47 In fact, by
the time Pena was decided, the Utah Court of Appeals had already set
41. Hodges v. Howell, 4 P.3d 803, 805 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Bowers v. Carter, 202
P. 1093, 1094-95 (Utah 1921)).
42. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 939.
43. Id. at 940.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 938.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 940.
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forth a workable framework for deciding mixed questions.48 The details
of this approach will be discussed below as a recommendation to the
Utah Supreme Court.49 For now, it is sufficient to point out that this
approach existed, that it offered a level of nuance and sophistication that
successfully accomplished everything Pena unsuccessfully attempted,
and that the Utah Supreme Court in Pena ignored it completely.
B. Practical Problems
Because rules of law easily and often define the parameters of their
own application, we must ask: What is the real reason that Utah appellate
courts refuse to define “how closely . . . [they will] scrutinize the
application of a statement of legal principle to a specific set of facts”?50
One answer to this question may be found in the difficulty appellate
courts have in quantifying discretion. They use various formulations to
express graded levels of discretion such as “a measure of discretion”51
and “something less than de novo [review].”52 These phrases attempt to
quantify an unquantifiable concept. The pasture metaphor is appealing as
a way of illustrating the fact that a judge may “reach one of several
possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts
without risking reversal.”53 However, the metaphor inescapably breaks
down when an appellate court attempts to give it practical expression by
verbalizing graded levels of discretion. The various formulations of
greater or lesser degrees of discretion become meaningless because one
cannot measure discretion the way one can measure a pasture.
Furthermore, as the cases subsequent to Pena demonstrate, the discretion
formulations end up as mere surplusage, irrelevant to the actual appellate
review.54 The spectrum of discretion metaphor also breaks down because
it necessarily implies that, at least at the margins, there is a similarity of
essence between law and fact and a similarity of essence between fact
and discretion. Such an implication makes no sense. Law is one thing,
fact is another, and sometimes law itself gives the trial court discretion
48. See State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 484-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Bench, J., concurring).
49. See infra Part IV.
50. Pena, 869 P.2d at 937.
51. State v. Honie, 57 P.3d 977, 994 (Utah 2002).
52. Pena, 869 P.2d at 940.
53. Id. at 937. This statement ought to be the touchstone of review of discretionary rulings.
However, as my analysis and recommendations below will show, issues granting trial court’s true
discretion should be fewer in number than current case law provides.
54. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 40 P.3d 611, 617 (Utah 2002); In re M.C., 82 P.3d 1159, 1163
(Utah Ct. App. 2003); Woodhaven Apartments. v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 925-26 (Utah 1997);
Walker v. Hansen, 74 P.3d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231,
233 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 780-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
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that is essentially something else.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the impossibility of
quantifying discretion: “Of course, the attempt to differentiate between
degrees of discretion in any meaningful way is impossible because
discretion is not quantifiable. Nevertheless, standards stating different
degrees of discretion do describe a mind set and influence appellate
approaches to reviewing particular issues.”55 This attempt to justify the
use of varying degrees of an unquantifiable concept simply underscores
the argument that such a “mind set” runs the very real danger of
exposing the rule of law to the individual personalities of judges. Such a
“mind set . . . influence[s] appellate approaches” in unpredictable and far
from transparent ways.56
The supreme court suggests that when important policy
considerations are present in a given issue, they will outweigh the need
for trial court discretion and will require uniformity and closer appellate
review.57 One may legitimately ask what, under our judicial system,
could be more important than “the interest in having uniform legal
rules”58 governing the amount of discretion available to a trial court in
the context of any issue? In a common law system, how can the courts
perform their function under a regime of uncertain boundaries?
Shouldn’t this always “outweigh” the problem of the “varying fact
patterns that would be relevant to [discretionary] determinations”?59
Aren’t there always “reasons of policy that require standard uniformity
among trial courts addressing [every] question”?60
For example, in State v. Perry, the Utah Court of Appeals considered
how much discretion to give trial courts in cases of alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel.61 Following Pena’s framework, it concluded that
such questions should be reviewed more closely than questions of
reasonable suspicion.62 Judge Russell W. Bench, in a concurring opinion,
stated:
No one has really articulated why we review some mixed questions
more searchingly than others. I seriously doubt that anyone can. By
definition, mixed questions are all fact sensitive and many also involve
constitutional questions. It is inconsistent and confusing for us to
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 490 n.3 (Utah 1997).
Id.
See Pena, 869 P.2d at 939; Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998).
Pena, 869 P.2d at 939.
Id.
Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1244.
See State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
See id. at 1239.
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review most questions under a deferential standard, but not all.63

This statement points to the impossibility of defining workable and
uniform standards for apportioning discretion or, as Pena described it,
for “fix[ing] allocation of power and responsibility between the trial and
appellate courts”64 when the courts become committed to a shifting
spectrum of discretion model.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Pena was never a workable analytic framework for approaching
mixed questions of law and fact. Utah courts thus should abandon the
spectrum of discretion model for approaching that standard of review.
Instead, Utah courts should adopt the approach used by the Tenth Circuit
for reviewing mixed questions of fact and law: “We review mixed
questions under the clearly erroneous or de novo standard, depending on
whether the mixed question involves primarily a factual inquiry or the
consideration of legal principles.”65 This is the perfect solution, granting
deference to the trial court where deference is due—namely, where
factual matters are concerned, since trial courts are experts at finding
facts and appellate courts are not. The clearly erroneous standard of
review for factual matters
represents a fixed allocation of power66 and responsibility between the
trial and appellate courts that is grounded in our distinct and
unchanging institutional competencies regarding questions of fact.
Because there is no inherent policy component in fact determinations, it
will never be appropriate for an appellate court to overturn a trial
court’s factual determinations when they have substantial record
support.67

The clearly erroneous standard of review thus permits the trial judge
63. Id. at 1245 (Bench, J., concurring).
64. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939.
65. Armstrong v. Comm’r, 15 F.3d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 1994).
66. This stands as perhaps the most glaring indictment of Pena’s own framework. While the
clearly erroneous standard of review certainly “represents a fixed allocation of power and
responsibility between the trial and appellate courts that is grounded in our distinct and unchanging
institutional competencies,” Pena, 869 P.2d at 939, Pena’s shifting spectrum of discretion
framework blurs the “allocation of power” by rendering impossible the task of deciphering just what
kind of discretion a trial judge has. Id. Thus, Pena pollutes the otherwise stable “allocation of
power” between trial courts and appellate courts by subjecting trial courts to review according to the
transient whims of appellate judges. Id.
67. Id.
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proper “grazing space” in issues that truly allow him or her to “reach one
of several possible conclusions . . . without risking reversal.”68 Further,
this approach ultimately requires appellate courts to outline the contours
of the law, thus satisfying the fundamental values of stare decisis and the
rule of law.
While this approach preserves the fact/law distinction, it has been
called “wooden” in its application.69 Utah courts thus treat this approach
as unsophisticated, lacking sufficient nuance to realistically apportion
appropriate discretion to trial courts where trial courts are in an
advantaged position.70 As mentioned above, nearly a year before Pena
the Utah Court of Appeals explained how this framework is, at the same
time, a workable and a nuanced way to analyze mixed questions of law
and fact.71 In State v. Rochell, the majority opinion “implie[d] that . . .
[the court of appeals] review[s] the trial court’s finding of reasonable
suspicion for correctness.”72 Judge Bench, in a concurring opinion
criticizing the majority, defined the two separate spheres of fact and law
and explained how the two spheres relate to each other.73 Appellate
courts owe broad discretion to trial courts as factfinders because of their
superior position to weigh evidence and to assess credibility.74
In recognizing the discretion properly allocated to trial courts, Judge
Bench asserted that findings of fact have “two possible prongs of attack:
a legal prong, and an evidentiary prong,”75 because “‘[a] trial court’s
finding is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary support
in the record or if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law.’”76 The
possibility of erroneous views of law inducing clearly erroneous findings
stands at the center of this approach. Further, understanding the nature of
that possibility provides appellate courts with the ability to properly
separate the “distinct and unchanging institutional competencies
regarding questions of fact”77 between trial courts and appellate courts:
Legal guidelines circumscribe a trial court’s traditionally broad
factfinding discretion when the court finds an ultimate fact. These
68. Id. at 937.
69. See id., at 938; State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1243 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (Bench, J.,
concurring).
70. See generally Pena, 869 P.2d 932.
71. See State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 484-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Bench, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 484.
73. See id. at 484-87.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 485.
76. Id. (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis
added)).
77. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).
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guidelines create a field of inquiry within which a trial court must make
its finding. If a trial court’s finding of ultimate fact is made in violation
of these legal guidelines, it is “induced by an erroneous view of the
law.” When an ultimate finding of fact is made in violation of a legal
guideline, we correct it under a correction-of-error standard of
review.78

The field of inquiry approach accomplishes the goals set forth in
Pena of determining how much discretion to afford a trial court79 and
accounting for the varying sets of facts that may come within a particular
rule’s reach.80 It accomplishes these goals because it allows appellate
courts to inform a trial court’s factfinding efforts by defining what
considerations have legal significance under a given rule. At the same
time, however, this approach preserves the distinction of essence
between fact and law, requires appellate courts to define precisely what
the law is, and permits appellate courts to review truly legal issues de
novo:
When a legal principle guides the factfinder, the factfinder’s task
differs from the finding of a basic or historical fact because “the field of
inquiry has limits defined, or capable of definition, by legal principle
and judicial discussion.” In other words, the factfinder is not allowed to
wander about picking just any old fact it finds persuasive or conclusive;
rather, the factfinder must remain within a specific field of inquiry
defined by the law and consider factual issues required by the law to be
considered.
An example may be helpful in understanding this concept. When a
factfinder must determine whether a person has committed a crime, it is
not allowed to decide arbitrarily what constitutes the offense. Rather,
the factfinder must consider the elements of the crime as defined by the
law. Furthermore, the factfinder is not allowed to base its decision on
irrelevant factors such as the defendant’s race, religion, prior bad acts,
etc. The law therefore creates a field of inquiry within which the
factfinder must function. The ultimate factual finding that the defendant
did, or did not, commit the crime charged is a factual determination,

78. Rochell, 850 P.2d at 485 (Bench, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added). See also State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (“[I]f we find the trial court failed to evaluate the significance of
uncontroverted facts, or facts as the court found them, in terms of relevant principles developed
through precedent, we may review the trial court’s conclusion of reasonableness under a correctionof-error standard, deciding that this conclusion was ‘induced by an erroneous view of the law.”)).
79. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937.
80. See id. at 939.
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“guided” by the law. To such findings we defer, so long as the
factfinder remained within a properly defined field of inquiry.81

In re B.T.D. provides an excellent example of how this approach
could work in practice.82 In B.T.D., a district court made a finding that a
mother consented under duress to the adoption of her children.83 The
Utah Court of Appeals stated, “Whether duress existed and was
sufficient to void consent is a mixed question of law and fact . . . .”84 To
find duress, the district court relied on an outdated list of factors.85 On
appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s finding of
duress, ruling as a matter of law that the finding was clearly erroneous.86
The court of appeals set forth the factors that district courts are legally
bound to consider when making a finding of duress87 and remanded the
case for further proceedings.88 The court of appeals did not discuss
whether the mixed question at issue permitted the district court a
measure of discretion in applying the legal standard to the facts and,
instead, focused on whether the district court used correct legal
principles while making findings of fact. In that case, the district court
used an entirely obsolete legal test to determine whether, as a matter of
fact, the mother consented to the adoption under duress; but even if it
81. Rochell, 850 P.2d at 485 n.3 (Bench, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting State v.
Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 521-22 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (Bench, J., concurring); cf. Pena, 869
P.2d at 939 (“[T]he facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no
rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out.”).
82. See 68 P.3d 1021, 1025-26 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
83. See id. at 1026.
84. See id. at 1024.
85. See id. at 1026. The district court articulated the following legal standard for making
duress findings:
Utah cases are in line with other jurisdictions in holding that where most of the circumstances
surrounding the signing of consent point to duress and undue influence, the court will allow
revocation of consent. [D.P. v. Social Services, 431 P.2d 547 (Utah 1967)]. Persuasion alone,
intense emotion at the time of signing alone, misunderstanding about the finality of consent
alone, financial or marital difficulties or promises alone, and even being medicated at the time
of signing alone is not enough to justify setting aside the consent. Each case must be decided
on its own facts, and all of the circumstances surrounding the signing of consent must
converge to show that the consent was given under duress and undue influence. See [D.P.,
431 P.2d at 551]; [In re Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)];
[In re Adoption of D., 122 Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223, 227 (Utah 1953)].’’
Id. (alterations in original).
86. See id.
87. See id. The court of appeals relied on the following legal standard for making findings of
duress: “Under . . . [the correct] legal standard, a ‘contract is voidable by the victim’ ‘[i]f . . . assent
is induced [(1)] by an improper threat [(2)] by the other party [(3)] that leaves the victim no
reasonable alternative.’” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981)
(alterations in original)). See also Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993) (adopting the
Restatement’s view of duress).
88. See id.
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used the correct, or nearly correct, test, the court of appeals could have
reviewed that test as a matter of law to determine whether the district
court’s duress finding stayed within the proper field of inquiry. While
B.T.D. does not expressly follow the fields of inquiry approach, it
correctly demonstrates the relationship between law and fact. It further
demonstrates the clarity and simplicity such an approach would provide
appellate courts.
At the time the supreme court issued Pena, the court of appeals had
issued a number of cases that utilized the field of inquiry approach.89 The
Utah Supreme Court should abandon the Pena approach and adopt the
fields of inquiry approach. The practical result would likely be the
wholesale abandonment of the idea of mixed questions and the
elimination of mixed questions from the categories of appellate standards
of review. To do so would provide a workable framework for appellate
courts and trial courts alike, clearly defining the limits of trial court
discretion and the closeness of appellate review. It would further serve
the purpose of providing transparency and consistency in the appellate
process. The fields of inquiry approach, in short, would conform Utah
law more closely to the values and ideals of stare decisis and the rule of
law.
V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPELLATE PRACTICE
Despite the Pena framework’s theoretical and practical pitfalls for
approaching mixed questions, it remains the law in Utah. Thus,
practitioners seeking reversal on appeal must continue to grapple with
Pena. This comment suggests two practical considerations that appellate
practitioners may find useful.
A. Pena is Complicated, Subtle, and Flexible
The most important thing a practitioner can do is to become
intimately familiar with Pena and its progeny. The Pena framework
itself can allow practitioners considerable latitude in articulating the
appropriate level of appellate scrutiny for a given mixed question. Thus,
a practitioner should never assume that the case law to date absolutely
pigeon-holes his or her present case into a strict category of discretionary
appellate review. Furthermore, without a good handle on Pena’s

89. See State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Rochell,
850 P.2d 480, 485 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Bench, J., concurring); State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473,
475 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 521 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (Bench,
J., concurring).
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spectrum of discretion framework, practitioners will find their research
very difficult. The sheer variety of, and seeming contradictions among,
the statements of the applicable standard of review will bewilder
practitioners.
A careful appellate practitioner can capitalize on the difficulty of
approaching this standard of review to the profound benefit of his or her
clients. By its very nature under the Pena framework, mixed question
discretion is fluid. The bounds of the trial judge’s discretion are
changeable. This is because the appellate court has already made a
determination that there are too many varying factual settings where a
particular legal standard may apply to make a definitive statement of the
law.90 This means that the bounds of trial courts’ discretion will be
fenced in a little more or sometimes expanded each time a novel factual
scenario arises. “Only when the trial judge crosses an existing fence or
when the appellate court feels comfortable in more closely defining the
law by fencing off a part of the pasture previously available does the trial
judge’s decision exceed the broad discretion granted.”91
For the practitioner, this means there will often be a good argument
to be made that the trial court ought to have more or less discretion than
was given to other trial courts in other cases. Unless the case at bar is
exactly like a previous case—an unlikely scenario, since the Utah
appellate courts are devoutly convinced of the hopeless variety of such
factual scenarios—then the scope of a trial judge’s discretion is always in
question.
B. How to Achieve Broader or Narrower Appellate Review
Arguments that substantial rights are at stake may help to narrow the
amount of discretion permitted the trial court. In State v. Thurman,92 for
example, the Utah Supreme Court determined:
[W]hile there were varying fact patterns that would be relevant to
determinations of voluntariness of consent, they were not so
unmanageable in their variety as to outweigh the interest in having
uniform legal rules regarding consent to search, given the substantial
Fourth Amendment interests lost as a result of such consents.93

90. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).
91. Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. I have an unsubstantiated suspicion that more often the discretion
will tend to diminish over time as appellate courts determine that more and more trial court rulings
fall outside the allotted discretion.
92. See 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993).
93. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993)).
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Thus, the supreme court did not grant broad discretion in that context.
The converse would also seem true— an argument that merely
procedural or less fundamental statutory rights are at stake may help in
defining the scope of discretion more broadly. As already noted in Platts
v. Parents Helping Parents, the supreme court granted very broad
deference to a trial court’s application of the statutory definition of
“health care provider” to the facts of the case.94 The procedural and
statutory rights at stake in Platts appear less important than the rights at
stake in Thurman, where a determination of the issue of the voluntariness
of consent results either in the availability or the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights. Thus, a practitioner should always preliminarily
consider the particular issue in the present case and ask whether, in a
broad public policy sense, the courts should be “comfortable in more
closely defining the law by fencing off a part of the pasture previously
available”95 or whether they should less closely define the law by
opening a part of the pasture previously unavailable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Pena has proved through critical examination and historical
application, to needlessly confuse the already complex question of trial
court discretion. Utah courts should explicitly abandon the framework as
it seems they may have already implicitly done. Instead, the Utah
Supreme Court should adopt the long-forgotten, but well-advised,
approach formulated in the early 1990s by the Utah Court of Appeals.
That approach uses the metaphor of fields of inquiry to describe the way
in which rules of law inform and guide a trial court’s fact finding efforts.
Until they do, practitioners may legitimately continue to capitalize on
Pena’s uncertainties. Artful advocacy and characterization of rights as
being more or less fundamental may prove an effective tool to achieve
victory on appellate review of mixed questions.96

94. See 947 P.2d 658, 662-63 (Utah 1997).
95. Pena, 869 P.2d at 938.
96. The author would like to recognize three people for their assistance in the writing of this
Note. Judge Norman H. Jackson provided invaluable personalized mentoring in appellate law and a
solid theoretical foundation in Utah standards of appellate review. Derek Kearl and Jamie Williams
both provided much needed editing and technical assistance and served as sounding boards to help
the development of the theory of this Note. Many thanks.

